A particular turning point?

Narrator's post:

Just as German and Japanese mistakes and failures in military strategy and economic production were crucial to overall Allied victory, so too was the Allied response to bridging and ultimately gaining the advantage in these areas. Individually, indeed doing so represented a turning point for the Allies. Collectively however, campaigns such as Barbarossa served as evidence of the combined impacts of these areas; the advantage gained in one area had either direct or indirect impacts upon the other areas in question. For instance, the recapturing of Soviet territory initially occupied by German forces meant therefore that Germany had less access to resources for production, increasing the chances of the Soviets and the Allies in gaining the advantage in overall economic production. Likewise, Japanese failure to improve the Zero against new planes such as the Hellcat by the US helped contribute not only to the US gaining the technological advantage over Japan in the Pacific, but more importantly, helped facilitate the US in gaining gradual command of the air as she pressed further with her “Island- Hopping” campaign in the Pacific. Just as command of the sky had proven to be crucial to Japanese, so was such command crucial to overall American strategy in this theater. Finally, as an example of Axis mistakes and failures and its impacts upon the military, political and moral areas, German failure to finish off the British army at Dunkirk or to defeat the RAF in the Battle of Britain was costly. These failures combined to give Churchill a renewed determination to fight on, and in conjunction rallied the British people to stand against perceived Nazi aggression. More importantly, German failure ensured Britain would become to launch point for Operation Overlord to liberate Europe in 1944. From hindsight, Hitler and Nazi Germany helped contribute to its own downfall.

Time

Narrator's post:

Gaining the advantage in these areas however took most of the war. As demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, there were no instant moments where the Allies quickly gained the advantage in one area and so secured the conditions necessary to win the war. By gaining the collective advantage in all these areas, the Allied turnaround was total and complete. A lot of effort had to be put into mobilizing economies, rallying their populations, work out between themselves vital questions of war aims and strategy, and more importantly, doggedly resist Axis advance in particular battles such as Stalingrad and Midway in order to at least stem Axis advances before any counter- offensive could be possibly launched, and all these took time ranging from months to a few years at least. But in doing so, the Allies helped ensure total and complete victory over the Axis powers in every theatre contested, be it Europe, the Pacific or Atlantic.

Capitalizing on Axis mistakes and failures

Narrator's post:

Mistakes and failures made by Germany and Japan were evident throughout the war and in the Atlantic, Europe and the Pacific. Examples of such mistakes and failures included particular instances, ranging from the failure to destroy the British Expedition Force at Dunkirk and the losses suffered by Japan, of four major aircraft carriers and skilled aviators at the Battle of Midway against the American task forces, to broader ones. Most prominent was the Grand Strategy of both Germany and Japan, both of which did not foresaw long periods of fighting, and so was flawed as Allied resolve to win meant the fighting was prolonged to levels the economies of both could not sustain till 1945. However, to achieve total victory, a lot depended upon the Allied response, to inadvertedly or not, capitalize on these mistakes. As discussed earlier, the regaining of the advantage in the industry and technological areas gave them the means to do so. By being able to out produce Japan in ships and planes, the US exploited the loss of air cover the Japanese suffered with the sinking of their carriers at Midway by fielding large numbers of planes in each of the campaigns they fought in the Pacific, an ability reinforced by the launching of at least 21 Essex- class carriers from 1942- 1945 onwards that had enough combined deck space for 3000 aircraft at least.